Mass Education from the War of 1870 to the War of 2001 by Falk, Clifford
Kansas State University Libraries 
New Prairie Press 
Adult Education Research Conference 2002 Conference Proceedings (Raleigh, NC) 
Mass Education from the War of 1870 to the War of 2001 
Clifford Falk 
Simon Fraser University, Canada 
Follow this and additional works at: https://newprairiepress.org/aerc 
 Part of the Adult and Continuing Education Administration Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License 
Recommended Citation 
Falk, Clifford (2002). "Mass Education from the War of 1870 to the War of 2001," Adult Education 
Research Conference. https://newprairiepress.org/aerc/2002/papers/18 
This is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences at New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Adult Education Research Conference by an authorized administrator of New Prairie Press. For more 
information, please contact cads@k-state.edu. 
Mass Education from the War of 1870 to the War of 2001
Clifford Falk
Simon Fraser University, Canada
Abstract: This work traces the involvement of the social practice termed
education, especially in its lifelong form, to the production of war from the




In December 1851, about forty years after the first Napoleonic empire collapsed (Battle
of Waterloo, 1815), the Emperor Napoleon’s nephew Louis (1808-1873) staged a coup d’état in
Paris, and following in his uncle’s footsteps, installed a second “post-revolutionary” empire in
France1.  This second empire ended in battle too, though much more ignominiously than the first
(the Franco-Prussian War of 1870).  Goaded into the war by the Prussian Prime Minister
Bismarck, Louis’ supposedly invincible armies engaged a recently recapitalized, retrained and
reorganized enemy much before they were prepared to do so.  The resulting military débâcle
(France was effectively defeated in six weeks) shook the imperial industrial world and resonates
eerily in postmodern postindustrial war.
While the “second empire” of post-revolutionary France has been read since as the
precursor of twentieth century fascism, it is the rise and fall of that empire that
presaged/prestaged not only the mass wars of the twentieth century, but also the militarized
peace.  The mobilization, deployment and destructive capabilities of the French and Prussian
armies bespoke the “total war” that defined the twentieth century, just as the civil and military
preparation for war in Prussia and France bespoke the postWWII era of “total peace”2.
Total war, made possible by the martial application of modern science, technology,
philosophy, industry and education, was based on the coordination, mobilization and deployment
of all the resources, civil or military, available to nationalized, imperial states.  Previewed early
in 19th century by the Napoleonic reconstitution of civil and military France, “total war” was
developed conceptually by the Prussian theorist von Clausewitz (On War, Berlin, 1832).  By
1917, Clausewitzian total war and its accompanying war economy had been generalized in the
previously discrete (Hegelian) social spaces between war and peace.  By the end of WWII,
“totally blended civil/military economies” marked industrialism.  Industrialism itself had become
a function of war/militarism, an inversion of the first industrial war (1870) when industry and
civil society were only partially militarized.
The apprehension of total war and fascism anticipated by the War of 1870 was not only
based in increased martial rigor (war lethality), but in nascent industrial (mass) communications
systems which lent themselves well (but not inevitably) to the production of military/industrial
subjectivity.  This new subject(ivity) was put to work when, as Bismarck recounted, the "Ems
telegram"…enrage(d) the French "not only on account of its contents"—a national insult—"but
also on account of the manner of its distribution"—directly to the populace of France and the
German states through mass circulation newspapers, as well as to the French government
through conventional diplomatic channels—so that "before midnight" on the same day as it was
sent, the telegram would "have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull"3.
The effect that telegram—like the highly symbolic but more deadly “telegram” recently
sent (9/11)—was contingent upon mass communications technologies and upon statist control of
the formation of subjectivity.  The high-speed printing press and the electrical telegram matched
with the mentalities of populations deliberately nationalized since the early 19th century, at least
from the time the ancien régime was overthrown in France (1789), and with a vengeance in the
German states from the time of the Napoleonic wars, to produce a war weapon all its own.
Indeed Bismarck, as well as his contemporary Nietzsche, may have been “postmodern”.
His understanding that language was comprised of form that could (depending on context)
determine content augured well for its military-industrial (and commercial) deployment.  Though
guile (lies, deception) had been employed for centuries (if not millennia) to whip up war fever,
the means Bismarck used to incite/excite the domesticated citizenry (les citoyennes) of France
and soon-to-be Germany proved as prescient as the war (and the peace) his mediations
precipitated/anticipated.
His deployment of mass media/literacy to disseminate mass hostility (sell a perception)
was based on the industrial formation of radical difference [the Other].  It speaks to the
opportunistic opening of a "popular perceptual front" just as soon as the technical means to do so
presented.  As such, the "Ems telegram" marks the launching of mass electromechanical
perceptual offences (and defenses) whereby the imperialism of "radical alterity" is
technologically/psychologically re-inscribed/re-vested.  Like the industrialization of war (and
commerce) more generally, industrialized wars of perception (for the minds [and hearts] of the
"people") were developed more fully forty years after Bismarck so decisively won the Franco-
Prussian war.
The propaganda offences of the Great War (1914-18), especially the reduction of whole
nations to “axis of evil”, evidenced the industrialization (and intense capitalization) not only of
war (i.e. total war) but of perception (at the time, the terms advertising and propaganda were
synonymous)4.  Virilio (1994: 13) writes:
The year 1914 not only saw the physical deportation of millions of men to the
battlefields.  With the apocalypse created by the deregulation of perception came a
different kind of diaspora, the moment of panic when the mass of Americans and
Europeans could no longer believe their eyes, when their faith in perception became slave
to the faith in the technical sightline: in other words the visual field was reduced to the
line of a sighting device.
The reduction of the visual field to a technical sightline opened visual perception to
constant (instrumental, commercial, political, military) refocus.  In effect, human visual
perception had been technologically (militarily) delimited (this follows Socrates in that
electromechanical prosthetics, like paper prosthetics [writing on paper or lambskin], involve gain
and loss).  The scope of already reduced Albertian (Renaissance) seeing—called perspective—
was reduced even further as the viewer was forcibly withdrawn from the scene/seen even more5.
The Learning Machine
All of us are already civilian soldiers without knowing it.  And some of us know it.
The great stroke of luck for the military class’s terrorism is that no one recognizes it.
People don’t recognize the militarized part of their identity, of their consciousness.
Virilio
Bismarck, by launching the "Ems telegram", provided the state with an industrial means
outside of compulsed participation in schooling, religion and the military (conscription) to
control/form “the people”, to engineer, however imperfectly, more or less uniform perception
and with that mass affect (disposition).  The First World War amalgamated/welded this theatre of
perceptual operation irrevocably to the theatre of war.  In effect, a statist industrialized
"perceptual front" was opened that complemented the more general industrialization of war (until
the nineteenth century, the perceptual theatre had been more strictly a military-religious than a
nation-statist concern).  With perception emerging from World War I reduced to a highly
mediated "sightline", the common perceptual field became even more regulated (a technical
sightline).  The means by which massed, national populations could be governed effectively
were available now.  Virilio (1994:23) writes:
To admit that for the human eye the essential is invisible and that, since everything is an
illusion, it follows that scientific theory, like art, is merely a way of manipulating our
illusions, went against the political-philosophical discourses then [1920s] evolving in
tandem with the imperative of convincing the greatest number, with its accompanying
desire for infallibility, and a strong tendency to ideological charlatanism.  Publicly to
point out how mental images are formed, including the way their pyschophysiological
features carry their fragility and limitations, was to violate a state secret of the same order
as a military secret, since it masked a mode of mass manipulation that was practically
infallible".
It is still not commonly recognized (apprehended) that what is seen (perceived) is as
highly mediated (and arbitrary) as the system of representation it is dependent upon; however,
when it is recognized, the recognition usually is functional (not theoretical) and employed to
garner some immediate instrumental advantage (e.g. marketing, advertising, politics, support for
war).  Popular culture (including the spectacles of war, politics, diplomacy and commerce) not
only depends on this "blind spot" (cynicism and irony signal awareness), but employs a
sophisticated understanding of the limited and contingent nature of perception to attract its
audience (e.g. to form "mass affect" and its off-shoots such as "public" opinion, war support and
"market" demand).
After Prussia’s stunning defeat of France in 1870, compulsion learning for young and old
was expanded throughout the new German Empire (often to incredible Church led resistance) by
the new Imperial Chancellor Bismarck and his Minister of Culture (education) Falk.  This
imperial system of forced schooling was employed in Kulturkampf (the culture war futilely
fought by the German Empire after the fighting ended).  From that time on, “industrialized
education” in all industrial jurisdictions, whether higher, elementary or adult, was militarized
similarly.  The “German model” profoundly influenced France and to some degree Britain,
though these nations had developed similar projects.  Japan followed the German model; its
impact in the U.S. became even greater than before the Franco/Prussian War.  Lenin followed a
Germanic/United Statesian educational/industrial model as he reformed the Russian Empire
(Henry Ford and Fredrick Taylor were his heroes).  The process of educationalization in all
industrial societies was the means for the military/industrialization of the contemporary self.
However, during the twentieth century, this equation was inverted as well—there was no
longer a need in for “real” soldier/civilians in postindustrial jurisdictions which now had the
means to wage virtual war (any more than there was a need for many “real" workers in a world
of “virtual” work).  This inversion was recognized first in France by Baudrillard, Foucault,
Virilio, Deleuze and Guatarri, all of whom took the Clausewitzian formula whereby “war is the
continuation of politics [Politick] by other means” and stood it on its head.  Politics, and other
social practices/discourses of control including education, were now the continuation of war by
other means (its massive generalization).  Foucault (1980:90) states: “power is war, a war
constructed by other means”.  Deleuze and Guatarri (1986:119):
Total war itself [World Wars I & II] is surpassed, towards a form of peace more
terrifying still [“Cold War” and terrorism].  The war machine has taken charge of the
aim, worldwide order, and the [nation] states are no longer anything more than objects or
means adapted to that machine.  This is the point at which Clausewitz’s formula is
effectively reversed; to be entitled to say that politics is the continuation of war by other
means, it is not enough to invert the order of the words as if they could be spoken in
either direction; it is necessary to follow the real movement at the conclusion of which
the States, having appropriated a war machine, and having it adapted to their aims,
reissue a war machine that takes charge of the aim, appropriates the States and assumes
increasingly wider political functions.
Virilio captured similar thought in his concept of “pure war”, which describes a “civil
peace” devoted to constant “preparation for war” (“postindustrial” economies are “blended” for
that reason.  The “information age” itself is a “spin-off” of U.S. military research and
development)6.  Baudrillard’s provocative The Gulf War Did Not Happen caught a vital aspect of
postindustrial militarization—its virtualization.  He argues that war in the era of hyperreality is a
media event.  The “war effect” might better describe the way “war” is experienced within
“postindustrial jurisdictions” now that low-grade hi-tech war (low intensity conflict) is quotidian
practice (e.g. the War of 2001).
However, these inversions of the conventional narrative whereby war and peace exist as
separate states of social being (i.e. the Hegelian concept of war), and of society as generally
peaceful and of education as an ultimately beneficent practice, cannot be accessed easily in a
discursive space that maintains a positive (learned) ignorance toward the prevalence, practice
and function of war/militarization.
This “willed innocence”, as James Baldwin calls it, is not so willed or innocent as he may
assume.  It is a product of a century and a half of statist-controlled learning (and education) as
this is contemporary perception itself—and what is perceived/conceived through its mediation—
with a deliberateness and on a scale hitherto unknown (through electrical/mechanical logistics of
perception evident in newspapers, radio, film, TV, the NET, and, most importantly, through
education—that vast project of deliberate subjective formation as it is actually practiced on-the-
ground).
During the twentieth century the field of education, like war and political life, suffered an
inversion as well, this inversion especially manifest in the euphemism and practice of lifelong
learning, now long removed from 19th. century British autodidacticism and totally attuned to its
19th. century military/industrial Prussian precursor.  Prussia then already conceived of education
as a cradle to grave operation (like Sparta and Plato’s Republic).  Today, like the person it forms
(Umbildung), education has transformed into a global learning system geared to a postindustrial
economy of relational simulation7.  Rather than “educating” in the liberal sense (Bildung), it is
designed to do just the opposite—to form destabilized subjectivity open to perceptual
reformation on-demand and just-in-time in postindustrial economic terms.
The learning machine—the restriction of sensorium through the formation of delimited
perception—is a function of the power of contemporary science, even philosophy, art and
literature, certainly social science, marketing, media theory, advertising, organization theory, and
much, much more.  Yet, since the 19th. century, these discourses in all but their functional
aspects (“how to” left in, “why” taken out) were removed even further from common view.  In
effect, the discourses that scientifically and philosophically made the instrumentalization of
perceptual production possible were kept out of common sight(lines), leaving most persons, even
if they wanted to know, without the conceptual or perceptual resources to con/perceive what was
going on.
Common “conceptual technology” simply did not keep up with technological and
scientific changes.  The perceptual gap, or better, the divide that developed early in the twentieth
century between “common” and “select” sensibility frames existence still.  This particular
“splitting of views” (history is replete with them) between the select and common forms of
learning was based on education (formal learning) alone, though, of course, access to that
learning form remained a function of particular discourses of class, gender, race and so on.
While reading and writing as defined in statist terms (mass literacy outside of the statist
form was prevalent in Europe and the US from the 18th century on) became mandatory, and
levels of formal education rose precipitously in the Western jurisdictions (and Japan).  The gap
between contemporary (counter-mechanical) philosophy, science, art, literature and
(mechanically modeled) common perception continued to grow.  In effect “common sense”—
Newtonian cosmology—was taught even while it (dis)abused the learner by undeveloping and
maldeveloping the ability to understand his/her environs (that is how wars for/of perception are
won).
The social bifurcation (schizophrenia) that resulted has yet to be commonly apprehended
and exposed.  To even admit to such a “split” would demonstrate once again that even the most
supposedly egalitarian and positive discourses (of technological redemption) are highly regulated
and selective, and like all higher levels of formal learning relegated to various specific places and
groups.  Unlike in the nineteenth century when autodidacticism in industrial economies was
turning this around, the lived experience of the human is again divorced from the intellectual
production that forms it, especially an understanding of the postindustrial technologies that
postliberal existence is predicated upon.
When Paul Virilio talks about the War Machine, he says the War Machine is never about
making war against an external enemy.  The War Machine is really about using an external
enemy (e.g. axis of evil) as a sacrificial kind of scapegoat for the endocolonization of your own
population, for the creation of a domestic bestiary.  So the logic then, the threefold logic of
tactics, strategy and logistics as developed by Clausewitz and first employed domestically by
Bismarck, is to “invade” your own population by employing the politics of radical alterity
(difference) in order to maintain/enhance very interested control.
                                                  
1 Full references are available upon request.
2 This is not to suggest that the Franco-Prussian War is comparable to World War I in terms of magnitude.  More
shells were expended in a single day on the Western Front in WWI than in the entire Franco-Prussian War.
However, the speed of German troop movements and the concentration of their violence evidenced the changed
nature of war.  The U.S. Civil War evidenced these same characteristics, though it did not have the same global
impact.  Mayor Guiliani was wrong when he said that “9/11” was the largest mass death in U.S. history, including
D-Day and Pearl Harbor.  It was the US Civil War Battle of Antietam (1862).
3 The infamous “Ems telegram” reported the happenings of a meeting between the King of Prussia and the French
ambassador to the Prussian chancellor Bismarck.  Bismarck made available an edited version of the document that
omitted the courtesies exchanged by the two participants.  This edited version, which was published in France and
the German states, further exacerbated the ill feeling between France and Prussia and led to calls for war in Paris
and Berlin.  France declared war on Germany on July 19, 1870.  With the French as apparent aggressors, Bismarck
                                                                                                                                                                   
was successful in enlisting the southern German states in the ensuing war.  The unification of all the German states
(except Austria) into modern Germany ensued shortly thereafter.  After 1870, Germany indisputably was Europe’s
leading military, commercial, cultural, technological, educational and scientific power.  Hegel’s history appeared to
be unfolding.
4 In the ancient era, Sun-Tzu, the other theorist of war comparable to Clausewitz, had already identified war as
centrally concerned with control of the "field of perception".  He advocated using the "tricks of the trade"
(purposive deception) to do so.  Paul Virilio, War and Cinema – The Logics of Perception introduced the martial
"logics of perception" to social theory in 1984.
5 Jay (1993:211) explains that following World War I:
The interrogation of sight hesitantly emerging in certain prewar works of philosophy and art was given an
intense, often violent inflection by the war, which also helped disseminate an appreciation of its
implications.  The ancien scopic régime, which we've called Cartesian perspectivalism, lost what was left of
its hegemony, and the very premises of ocularcentrism themselves were soon being called into question in
many different contexts.
6 Postindustrialism co-exists alongside preindustrialism and industrialism.  For example, one geographic area may
be “totally wired” and dedicated to the production of information (for example, the accounting data produced in
India “overnight” for transnational accounting firms based in Europe and NA), a preindustrial production platform
may be located nearby, while an industrial gas works may be located between.  Each of these, in turn, in aspects
increasingly resembles the others (blending).  The industrial plants adopt digital technologies, while the accounting
firms come to resemble the preindustrial “outputting” operations.  This mixture was not possible until the 1980s.
However, all “advanced” economies at root are a function of “third generation” industrial technologies (e.g.
electrical generation, advanced metallurgy, petrochemicals [plastics], hierarchical corporate structures).  In this
rendering, modes of production are contiguous.  Postindustrial refers to an economy of the interior based in the
production/consumption of immaterial goods as compared to an economy of the exterior based in the
production/consumption of material goods.  This differs from the original meaning (Tourraine, 1971, Bell,1973)
7 Fredric Jameson speaks of Brecht’s development, through the character Galy Gay in Mann ist Mann, of a
prototype of “psychic de and re-construction [Umbildung]” (Brecht and Method, London & New York:
Verso1998:77).  Winthrop-Young writes:
the old concept of Bildungsroman—if it ever was more than an obstinate figment of scholarly
imagination—must come to an end; for Bildung, programmed by the Goethean algorithm to result in the
unfolding of a personality core, was tied to a harmonious mixture of worldly experience with education
derived from reading the proper books.
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young. “Media Magic Mountain”. Reading Matters. (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press),
1997:29-52.
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